Unsound strategic bidding and the competition perspective by Guardado Lundqvist, André
	   
 
FACULTY	  OF	  LAW	  
Lund	  University	  
	  
	  
André	  Guardado	  Lundqvist	  
	  
	  
Unsound	  strategic	  bidding	  and	  the	  
competition	  perspective	  
	  
	  
JAEM03	  Master	  Thesis/LAGM01	  Examensarbete	  
	  
European	  Business	  Law/Juristprogrammet	  
30	  higher	  education	  credits	  
	  
Supervisor:	  Henrik	  Norinder	  
Term:	  VT15	  
Contents 
SUMMARY 1	  
PREFACE 3	  
ABBREVIATIONS 4	  
1	   INTRODUCTION 5	  
1.1	   Background 5	  
1.2	   Research questions 5	  
1.3	   Relation EU / National Legislation 6	  
1.4	   Definition of the concept: Strategic bidding 7	  
1.5	   Method 8	  
1.6	   Delimitations 9	  
1.7	   Disposition 10	  
2	   SOUND AND UNSOUND STRATEGIC BIDDING 11	  
2.1	   General remarks 11	  
2.2	   Sound Strategic bidding 11	  
2.3	   Unsound strategic bidding 13	  
2.3.1	   Suppliers do not fulfill their obligations 14	  
2.3.2	   Corporate strategic bidding 15	  
2.3.3	   Manipulation of relative evaluation models 16	  
2.3.4	   Abnormal low tenders 19	  
2.3.5	   Undeclared work 22	  
2.3.6	   Breach of health and safety regulations 23	  
2.3.7	   Breach of Contract 23	  
2.4	   Competition aspect of UNSB 24	  
2.4.1	   General remarks 24	  
2.4.2	   Anti-competitive agreements – ch. 2 § 1 KL 24	  
2.4.3	   Abuse of Dominant position - ch. 2 § 7 KL 27	  
2.5	   Reflection 29	  
3	   UNSOUND STRATEGIC BIDDING CASES 31	  
3.1	   General remarks 31	  
3.2	   Manipulation of relative evaluation model 31	  
3.3	   Abnormal low tender 32	  
3.4	   Abuse of Dominant position in public procurement – ch. 2 § 7 KL 34	  
3.5	   Anti-competitive agreement in public procurement - ch. 2 § 1 KL 35	  
3.6	   Reflection 37	  
4	   REMEDIES 38	  
4.1	   General remarks 38	  
4.2	   Swedish Public Procurement Act 38	  
4.2.1	   Appeal and Damages 38	  
4.2.2	   Exclusion of supplier 39	  
4.2.3	   Rejection of abnormal low tender 40	  
4.2.4	   Termination of a procurement 41	  
4.2.5	   Reflection 42	  
4.3	   Swedish Competition Act 43	  
4.3.1	   Obligations and Commitments 44	  
4.3.2	   Competition Fine 45	  
4.3.3	   Damages 45	  
4.3.4	   Trading prohibition 46	  
4.3.5	   Leniency programme 47	  
4.3.6	   Reflection 48	  
5	   THE INTERACTION BETWEEN COMPETITION AND PUBLIC 
PROCUREMENT 50	  
5.1	   Reflection 54	  
6	   ANALYSIS 55	  
6.1	   Introduction 55	  
6.2	   How can the legislator prevent UNSB? 56	  
6.3	   Could coordination between public procurement and competition  
prevent UNSB? 61	  
6.4	   Conclusion 62	  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 65	  
TABLE OF CASES 68	  
 
 1 
Summary 
Public procurement represents almost 17 % of the EUs gross domestic 
product (GDP) which is why it is important to understand what unsound 
strategic bidding (UNSB) is and what the consequences could be if not 
prevented. Furthermore, it is often bigger companies that are willing to take 
the risk that comes with utilizing UNSB. If such UNSB is not prevented it 
will probably distort competition in the long run. At first it will probably 
cause the prices to get lower on the market for the contracting authorities; 
but, later on it will enable bigger companies to expand and acquire larger 
market shares and finally cause fewer players in particular markets. So the 
question that arises is, how can this situation be prevented? UNSB isn’t per 
se illegal, at the moment.  But, as this thesis will argue, competition will be 
distorted if UNSB is not prevented and, therefore, the legislator should 
overlook the interaction between competition and public procurement.  
 
The Swedish public procurement act (LOU) is a procedural law that 
explains how the contracting authorities should execute a procurement 
procedure and there are certain remedies in order to stop certain types of the 
UNSB behaviour, if they become noticed. But, how can the UNSB types 
that are not  solved by LOU be prevented? In my opinion competition law 
could be a solution. Competition law will discourage companies from using 
bid rigging and all other sorts of anti-competitive agreements that could 
occur under a public procurement procedure.  
 
My opinion is that these two systems should coordinate with each other to 
ensure effective competition. Furthermore, it should be noted that all UNSB 
problems cannot be prevented, currently, under LOU and therefore there is a 
need to educate the personnel at the contracting authorities so as they might 
detect such UNSB behaviours as well as to do competition assessments. 
These potential remedies would prevent the UNSB behaviours before they 
occur. Notably, the remedies that are under LOU, especially those for 
 2 
exclusion of a supplier and rejection of abnormally low tenders, are needed 
to be coordinated with the provisions under competition law especially ch. 2 
§ 1 and 7 in the Swedish competition act in order for the prevention to be 
successful. 
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Abbreviations 
UNSB   Unsound strategic bidding 
SCA  Swedish Competition Authority 
KL  Swedish Competition Act (2008:579)  
LOU  Swedish Public Procurement Act (2007:1091)  
TFEU  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
The Swedish competition authority has acknowledged a problem concerning 
manipulation of public procurement procedures—that is, unsound strategic 
bidding (UNSB). UNSB occurs mostly in industries such as office 
materials, food and engineering. UNSB in public procurement procedures is 
not illegal but it might affect the outcome of public procurement procedures 
in a negative way.  Companies/suppliers might very well win procurements, 
which they rightfully should not, and the consequences might be 1) the 
exclusion of other companies from the procurement procedures and 2) a 
subsequent  distortion of competition. Further, such a procurement 
procedure will inevitably cost more for the taxpayers than if UNSB had not 
affected the procedure.1  
 
This essay will try to shed light on what UNSB is, and moreover, to analyze 
the UNSB through both public procurement and competition perspective. 
UNSB is a problem that affects the market negatively and that is why these 
two areas should be coordinated in order to prevent the behaviours. The 
competition perspective in public procurement procedures is important to 
consider because it is often bigger companies that have the resources to use 
UNSB, in the form of being a dominant company abusing its position to win 
public contracts by, for example, the submission of abnormally low tenders 
or through the existence of an anti-competitive agreement with a competitor 
about not interfering in the procedure.  
1.2 Research questions 
The questions that arise: 
1. How can the legislator prevent unsound strategic bidding?  
                                                
1 http://www.offentligaaffarer.se/2011/06/21/se-upp-med-osunda-strategiska-anbud/, 2015-03-02. 
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2. Could coordination between public procurement and competition 
prevent unsound strategic bidding?  
 
The main objective with the essay is, as stated above, to research UNSB and 
how it relates to public procurement and competition. Hence, UNSB is a 
problem that occurs in public procurement, but also affects competition.  
 
Lundvall and Pedersen have acknowledged three different kinds of unsound 
strategic bidding, but the differentiation between them is a little ambiguous 
because there are behaviours that overlap with each other; for example, 
corporate strategic bidding could be something that is attempted in order to 
manipulate relative evaluation models. The three different categories are: 
1. Suppliers do not fulfil their obligations 
2. Corporate strategic bidding 
3. Manipulation of relative evaluation models 
  
UNSB includes also the problem with abnormal low tenders, which will be 
addressed subsequently in this thesis.  
1.3 Relation EU / National Legislation 
In some competition cases there are some forms of anti-competitive 
behaviours in procurement procedures which could fall under the definitions 
for UNSB, as for example corporate strategic bidding could be something 
that a dominant firm does in order to exclude a competitor from the market, 
which therefore could be a problem under ch. 2 § 7 KL, known as predatory 
pricing. It might also be seen as an anti-competitive agreement, or “cartel”. 
A cartel can exist where a company has concluded an agreement with its 
parent company in order to give an abnormally low tender in the 
procurement. The UNSB could have the same negative outcome whether it 
is seen through competition law as an anti-competitive agreement, or public 
procurement as corporate strategic bidding. I do not agree with Lundvall and 
Pedersen that UNSB does not have any withstanding effects on the market 
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and will demonstrate the need to coordinate competition and public 
procurement through the concept of UNSB. The concept shows the collision 
between public procurement and competition where the interaction does not 
function in its full extent. 
 
The essay will be based on material from the EU, such as public 
procurement directive, articles 101 and 102 TFEU and certain case law. The 
aim is not to answer the questions from a different perspective than the 
Swedish. The case law has been used to strengthen the discussion about the 
interaction between public procurement and competition. This case law 
highlights the current state of the interaction between public procurement 
law and competition law. I am also aware of that a large part of the essay 
depends on Swedish legal sources, which will cause problem for non-
Swedish speaking people to check the sources. This is the case because a 
large part of my essay centers on Swedish law.  
 
Swedish legislation, such as LOU and KL, is mostly used throughout this 
essay but both regulations are based on the requirements of EU law. The 
paper is therefore based on overarching EU law but the concept and the 
criticism against the two systems were more effectively presented, as well 
as more interesting for me as a Swedish practitioner, under national 
legislation.   
 
The Swedish public procurement act is based on the classical directive 
2014/24/EU and the Swedish competition act is based on art. 101 and 102 
TFEU.  
1.4 Definition of the concept: Strategic 
bidding 
Unsound strategic bidding will be defined as situations where tenderers 
alone or together with others breach a condition, or have the intention to do 
so, and that breach is contrary to the opinion of the contracting authority as 
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to how a supplier should act. UNSB leads unambiguously to a poorer 
outcome in the procurement procedure because competition is distorted if it 
occurs. 
 
Sound strategic bidding is a situation where one utilizes knowledge of the 
market to obtain or create an advantage over the contracting authority and 
other bidders. This is a situation where one might bend the laws and 
regulations but do not breach them. More examples will follow. 
1.5 Method 
This thesis utilizes the traditional judicial method, which entails the research 
and analysis of traditional legal sources with a focus on laws, preparatory 
works and case law. The method includes a requirement to master legal 
source doctrine, the legal argumentation, the judicial concept formation and 
structure, etc.2 Almost immediately, however, I realized that even though 
there is much material on public procurement in the form of directives, 
preparatory works and case law, the question of UNSB and how to prevent 
it is not fully explored. An overview comparison with both legal areas was 
needed in order to make the reader aware of how the two systems interacted 
and worked. To be able to discuss a possible solution, much of the essay is 
descriptive. This essay should be seen as an enlightment to the legislator and 
practitioners that the interaction is needed in order to prevent UNSB and the 
competition assessment is the solution in my opinion. But, possible 
solutions as to how UNSB should be regulated in detail is something this 
short essay cannot address. This essay aims to be accessible to readers who 
do not have much familiarity with Swedish law and therefore in most parts 
is a descriptive view of the two systems. Otherwise, it would have been 
difficult to discuss, and for the reader to understand, the solutions and the 
importance of the interaction between public procurement and 
competition—hence, also, the need for changes. There are several other 
regulations that could be affected by my solutions, which could not be 
                                                
2 Jareborg, Rättsdogmatik som vetenskap, SvJT 2004 p. 4. 
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analysed in this essay, due to the space, but is of importance if or when 
legislation attempts to solve the problem of the interaction between public 
procurement and competition, in detail. They would then need more indepth 
analysis of the systems and provisions that will be affected, in other words a 
preparatory work.  
1.6 Delimitations 
This essay does not have the ambition to cover the interaction between 
public procurement and competition in detail. Instead the essay is more of 
an overview in order for a reader to see the problems that are created by the 
non-existence of interaction between public procurement and competition 
law. Hence, the focus will be on the issue of UNSB. There are two sides of a 
public procurement transaction, and anti-competitive behaviour can occur 
on both sides of this transaction. However, the thesis is only going to cover 
restraint of competition created by the tenderers and not by the procurers. A 
selection of particularly interesting judgments will be utilized to serve as a 
background for the question about the coordination between competition 
and public procurement. The analysis will contain a discussion whether 
LOU could prevent UNSB and/or if coordination between competition and 
public procurement could otherwise be a solution. The reader should be 
aware that this essay requires the reader to have basic knowledge of public 
procurement law and competition law, because it will start by explaining the 
issue of unsound strategic bidding under the two legal areas. The essay will 
focus on the Swedish laws, LOU and KL but the Swedish laws are of course 
based on EU directives and regulations. The issue as such, UNSB, is 
relatively new which has made the research more interesting because there 
are not that many relevant articles or literature. Nonetheless, the subject is of 
major importance and both practitioners and legislators should be made 
aware of the corresponding legal issues so as to prevent or avoid said issue 
in the future.  
 
 
 10 
The essay has the point of view that UNSB has a negative outcome because 
it distorts competition and therefore needs to be prevented.  
1.7 Disposition 
The essay begins by outlining the concept of sound and unsound strategic 
bidding. The object is to show unsound strategic bidding through a public 
procurement perspective as well as the competition aspect. As stated before, 
UNSB is a problem in public procurement and mostly the same problem 
could fall under competition law. Moreover, chapter 3 will deal with 
important cases on the area that will exemplify the non-existing 
coordination between the regulations. Chapter 4 will go through different 
remedies that are available. In chapter 5, there will be some arguments to 
shed light on the problem with non-existing coordination between the two 
legal areas. Lastly, in chapter 6 the questions should be discussed and a 
conclusion will be made. 
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2 Sound and unsound strategic 
bidding 
2.1 General remarks 
In this chapter I will try to explain sound and unsound strategic bidding. 
Firstly, a distinction will be made between UNSB under public procurement 
and what the problems are and how the problems could occur under 
competition law. The behaviour could have the same consequences but be 
dealt differently depending on which law is applicable. I remind the reader 
that the focus is on the behaviour and how the behaviour in public 
procurement procedures can be prevented. There are cases that will be 
analysed in the next chapter, where UNSB has occured in public 
procurement procedures but has not been dealt with through Swedish public 
procurement act (LOU) but where the Swedish competition act (KL) is 
applicable.  
2.2 Sound Strategic bidding 
Sound strategic bidding does not necessarily lead to a poorer outcome. For 
example, “sound”, or only strategic bidding could occur where a tenderer 
has better information about the upcoming actual sales volume that is 
needed than the contracting authority. The tenderer could use that 
knowledge advantage to increase his chances to win the procurement.3  
 
In this way, the company can submit a bid in which the authority has 
overestimated the need in a category, why the price is set low, and in other 
categories where the prices are increased slightly. For example, if a 
municipality for a building project believes that it needs to dispose of four 
tons of mud and buy one ton of gravel, this would be stated in the tender 
document. Think now of the situation that the municipality, in reality, only 
                                                
3 Lundvall and Pedersen, Osund strategisk anbudsgivning i offentlig upphandling, p. 8. 
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disposes of two tons of mud but needs to buy six tons of gravel. A 
construction company with local knowledge that knows the proportions that 
will actually be needed could use this knowledge and submit a bid with a 
low price to ship the mud and a high price on gravel, without partaking in 
UNSB.4 
 
There are several other situations where a tenderer can exploit weaknesses 
or ambiguities in a tender document or in an evaluation model without being 
considered to have partaken in unsound or reprehensible behaviour. On the 
contrary, it is a natural commercial behaviour when the tenderer attempts to 
make the bid as competitive as possible on the conditions that the 
contracting authority has set in the tender document.5 
 
An example of strategic bidding, that is not unsound, is a situation where the 
contracting authority has requested products that are incomplete. If the 
supplier knows that the contracting authority will have to make additional 
purchases in order to get a working product but these enhancements are not 
evaluated in the procurement, then it is likely that the bidder shall lower 
their prices on the products which are being evaluated and raise their prices 
on the parts of the product that are not evaluated. This may not, in itself, be 
said to be UNSB.6 
 
There may also be economic or business reasons for having abnormally low 
prices, for example if there is an economic recession, the demand from the 
market will reduce and that will increase competition for the public 
contracts. Expensive warehousing and goods with a short lasting time can 
also be a reason for an abnormally low bid. The products can already have 
been produced and just take up storage space and therefore the company can 
make an abnormally low bid. Moreover, it could be the best way to for new 
market entrant to penetrateenter into a untapped market and/or provides a 
                                                
4 Lundvall and Pedersen, Osund strategisk anbudsgivning i offentlig upphandling, p. 45. 
5 Lundvall and Pedersen, p. 27.  
6 Lundvall and Pedersen, p. 45-46.
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good customer reference for future business. These are just some reasons 
and explanations why a company mightwant to submit a tender which will 
inevitably prove to be a loss for the company.7 
 
If the abnormally low tender could be a loss seen in isolation, but there 
could be other benefits that the supplier value higher, then there isn’t any 
rational basis for the contracting authority to reject such an abonormal low 
offer under the provision ch. 12 § 3 LOU. Simply, whether a bid might 
potentially be abnormally low and be subject to rejection is difficult 
determination for a contracting authority to make.8 
2.3 Unsound strategic bidding 
Lundvall and Pedersen have recognised three types of different unsound 
strategic biddings in public procurement procedures:  
“1. Suppliers do not fulfill their obligations 
For example, they do not to supply low-priced goods/services, 
or substitute these items for a more expensive option. 
2. Corporate strategic bidding 
Two or more firms, typically in the same group, adjust their bids 
so that they in a framework agreement are ranked better. Then, 
when it is time to deliver, they only offer the "normal" priced 
products, and send the other deliveries for low-priced products 
on to a group colleague. 
3. Manipulation of relative evaluation models 
A company sends in a "dummy" bid to make it easier for another 
company to win a contract in which a relative evaluation model 
is used.”9 
 
The general finding of Lundvall and Pedersen is that the costs of UNSB is 
not equivalent to higher prices for the goods and services that contracting 
                                                
7 Lundvall and Pedersen, p. 27 ff. 
8 Lundvall and Pedersen, p. 28-29. 
9 Lundvall and Pedersen, p. 10. 
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authorities buy. Instead, UNSB seems only to have increased the 
administrative costs, such as managing the trials, cancellation of contracts 
and lack of delivery. These costs are difficult to measure, but Lundvall and 
Pedersen’s conclusion is that said costs are huge. Low bids from especially 
large suppliers thus risk the eventual elimination of smaller players on the 
market who do not have the resources to be able to take the risks that are 
associated with abnormally low bids.10 On the other hand, it appears evident 
that a certaindanger exists in that competition might not only be reduced but 
also completely eliminated by the UNSB and, thus, it is important to 
coordinate competition with public procurement. 
 
So what are the remedies that are applicable in order to prevent these UNSB 
behaviours? In LOU there is exclusion of a supplier, damages, fines or 
rejection of tender. The question still remains, are these remedies sufficient 
in order to prevent UNSB in public procurement procedures? This will be 
examined more in-depth later on in the essay. When it comes to the 
competition aspect of UNSB, the remedies are damages, fines, prohibition 
to engage in commercial activities, and interim measures with or without 
penalty payment. More about the remedies and case law can be found in the 
chapters 3 and 4.   
 
2.3.1 Suppliers do not fulfill their obligations 
The first type of UNSB is where tenderers submitting tenders with prices 
and other conditions that the bidder does not intend to comply with during 
the contract period. They offer favourable terms, which the tenderer does 
not intend to apply, which increases the bidders chances of being awarded 
the framework agreement in the procurement procedure. The conduct means 
that other bidders, which expect to meet its obligations and therefore 
calculate with higher costs, do not get the chance to be awarded the 
framework agreement. This conduct might also result in higher overall costs 
for the contracting authority. This type of problem mostly occurs with 
                                                
10 Lundvall and Pedersen, Osund strategisk anbudsgivning i offentlig upphandling, p. 48. 
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regard to framework agreements with a tenderer but should be able to occur 
with framework agreements that require renewed competition as well.11  
 
2.3.2 Corporate strategic bidding 
The second category of UNSB is corporate strategic bidding. This is where 
several tenderers that usually, but not necessarily, belong to the same group 
of corporations, coordinate their bidding in the procurement process. Each 
tenderer submits tenders with more favourable terms in one category each—
for example, a price of zero kronor—but less favourable conditions in the 
other categories. The more favourable conditions in one category result in 
all the tenderers obtaining a good average score and therefore inclusion in 
the framework agreement and, in cases where ranking is applied, potentially 
a higher ranking in the framework agreement. During the suborder or 
renewed competition, however, the primary supplier declines to deliver in 
the category which he gave the most favourable terms in and to submit a 
new bid for the benefit of another interested tenderer (belonging to same 
corporate group) with a higher price and a higher price ceiling (or otherwise 
more favourable terms). This type of problem can only occur in agreements 
with several tenderers.12  
 
Supplier  Service A 
SEK/hour 
Service B 
SEK/hour 
Average Price 
SEK/hour 
A 4 0 2 
B 0 6 3 
C 6 2 4 
 
In the table above, two companies that coordinate their bidding can 
manipulate so as to win a procurement by giving an abnormally low bid in 
one category and standard bids in the other. As one can observe, the average 
                                                
11 Lundvall and Pedersen, p. 40; SOU 2013:12, p. 153-154. 
12 Lundvall and Pedersen, Osund strategisk anbudsgivning i offentlig upphandling, p. 40-41. 
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price is lower for companies A and B, because of the abnormally low bid in 
one category each. As stated earlier, where the suborder or renewed 
competition is at hand, then the primary supplier, company A, might decline 
to deliver in for example (service B) because then the other company B will 
take over the assignment to supply and the cost for the contracting authority 
will be much higher than if company C would have been included in the 
framework agreement. This is a behaviour that might fall under competition 
law as well and might be prevented if competition assessments are 
undertaken on a regular basis. More about this problem can be found within 
chapter 2.4. 
 
2.3.3 Manipulation of relative evaluation models 
The basis for the award of a contract at the assessment stage is separated 
between two distinct types—the lowest price and what is economically most 
advantageous. Lowest price allocation means that the purchaser chooses the 
tenders, which meet all requirements, and has the lowest tender price. When 
selecting the lowest price, the tenders shall not be compared in any other 
way than the price. This award decision is suitable if the contracting 
authority has insight on what kind of quality is required or available on the 
market. Thus, the quality requirements can be set high and must be met by 
all the tenders before the evaluation. It must be clearly stated in the tender 
documents what is considered to be included in the total price and how the 
price is evaluated.13  
 
The most economically advantageous tender is determined on the basis of 
both the quality aspects of the tender as well as the overall price. Again, it is 
important that the award criteria and the valuation of said criteria 
aredescribed in the tender document prior to any tender. The award criterias 
are what make a bid more beneficial than another, in both quality aspects 
but also in price. It should also be the same requirements for the tenderers 
                                                
13 Molander, Per (2009). Regelverk och praxis I offentlig upphandling. p. 37-39; Upphandlingsstöd 
(2010), Anbudsutvärdering vid offentlig upphandling och tjänster, p.6-8.  
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on how they can achieve the given criteria. Normally, evaluation criteria are 
based on the use of scales that are either set in points or in monetary values. 
There are several requirements upon award criteria. The criteria must 
address the product / service and not the supplier or its ability to deliver a 
given product / service. They must be measurable and verifiable. They 
should not give the contracting authority unrestricted freedom of assessment 
and they must comply with EU law principles including, but not limited to, 
transparency and non-discrimination.14 
 
The most common way to evaluate differing tenders is through a relative 
evaluation model that puts points on the submitted tender that weighs both 
quality and price. Then the contracting authority evaluates and awards the 
tenderer a score. For example, a contracting authority that uses the award 
criterion of the most economically advantageous tender, states in the tender 
documents that the tenders will be evaluated in terms of price and quality, 
each of which will carry equal weight in the evaluation. This opens up 
opportunities for bidders to bid with strategic attempt to influence the 
outcome of the procurement.15  
 
For example, company A and B has submitted tenders that are shown in 
Table 1 below.  A's tender implies a lower price but also a lower quality 
than the supplier B's tender. In order to balance the quality and price so that 
the offers can be compared, the following formulas below are used to 
transform the tender price and quality to a price and quality score in 
points.16 
 
The formulas:  
Price Score = (lowest price / bid price) x100x0.5, where 0.5 indicates the 
importance the contracting authorities said they attach to the evaluation 
criterion of price. 
                                                
14 Upphandlingsstöd (2010). Anbudsutvärdering vid offentlig upphandling och tjänster, p. 6-8.  
15 Lunander. A & Andersson A., p. 6. 
16 SOU 2013:12, p. 152. 
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Quality Score = (bid-quality / high quality) x100x0.5 where 0.5 indicates the 
importance the contracting authorities attach to the evaluation criterion of 
quality.17 
Table 1 – Relative Evaluation model which is NOT manipulated18 
Supplier  Price Quality Price Score Quality Score Total Score 
A  10  6  50  30 80  
B  15  10  33  50 83 
 
Table 2 - Relative Evaluation Model which is manipulated19 
Supplier  Price Quality Price Score Quality Score Total Score 
A  10  6  50  23 73  
B  15  10  33  38 72 
C  40  13  13  50 63  
 
Column three and four in the tables shows the price and quality scores 
which have been calculated with the above formulas. Now, when the 
evaluation criteria are expressed in the same unit, points, they can easily be 
compared with each other. The relative evaluation model, however, has 
several basic inherent weaknesses (shown with table 2), which makes it, 
according to SCA, open for manipulation, so-called UNSB.20 
 
The first criticism against the model is that the contracting authority or 
entity does not need to consider how the different evaluation criterias relate 
to each other. The fundamental question that the contracting authority needs 
to consider is if the difference in price between the two bids (see table 1), 5 
kronor, is worth more than the difference in quality, equivalent to 4 points. 
If so, then supplier A's bid is economically more advantageous than the 
competitor's bid. If this is not the case, but the contracting authority 
considers that the difference in quality is more important or more valuable 
                                                
17 Lundvall and Pedersen, Osund strategisk anbudsgivning i offentlig upphandling, p. 42. 
18 SOU 2013:12, p. 153. 
19 Lundvall and Pedersen, Osund strategisk anbudsgivning i offentlig upphandling, p. 43-44. 
20 SOU 2013:12, p. 154. 
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than the price difference, then supplier B's offer should or must be accepted. 
Therefore, there is a clear risk that the contracting authorities or entities 
using this model do not choose tenders which are in actuality the most 
economically advantageous.21 The second criticism concerns the evaluation 
model's sensitivity to the tenders that are received. Suppose in the above 
example that a third supplier C submits a tender whose price is 40 and 
whose quality aspect is estimated at 13 points (see table 2). What happens 
when applying the formulas for price and quality score is that the ranking 
between the first two tenders A and B are reversed. When only A and B 
were compared through the relative tender evaluation model as the basis, the 
supplier B's bid appeared as the most favourable. When supplier A and B 
are compared with another tenderer, C, the result is rather that A's bid 
appears to be the most economically advantageous. The contracting 
authority's evaluation of A's and B's tender is thus affected by the presence 
of a third tenderer, C, which is not particularly attractive.22 The example 
illustrates thus a situation where a dummy bid can contribute to enable 
another bidder to win, than what otherwise would have occured. 
 
2.3.4 Abnormal low tenders 
There are situations where a tender is so low that there may be reason to 
suspect that some misunderstanding has arisen, that the tender was based on 
incorrect assumptions, or that the tenderer is not serious in its commitment 
to deliver according to what is proposed in the tender. Contracting 
authorities may experience difficulties in making a fair and objective 
examination of the bids because of the legitimate difficulty, on the basis of 
the bids, to assess the quality of the offered product or service. Furthermore, 
many times the price determines which tenderer will be awarded the 
procurement contract which inevitably means that the pricing will be of 
primary importance. Too low tenders are likely to result in the bidder’s 
                                                
21 SOU 2013:12, p. 154-155. 
22 Lundvall and Pedersen, Osund strategisk anbudsgivning i offentlig upphandling, p. 43. 
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inability to deliver on the tender or deliver a bid of sufficiently lower 
quality.23 
 
Ch. 12 § 3 & art 69 “Classical” Procurement directive24 states:  
A contracting authority that finds a tender abornmally low shall demand an 
explanation for it. The tender can be disqualified but only after the 
contracting authority has demanded in writing an explanation for the 
abornmal low bid and that they haven’t got a satisfying answer. 
 
Failure to deliver in accordance with the bid may, as mentioned earlier, 
oblige the contracting authority to implement a new procurement, which 
could mean higher costs for both the contracting authority and for 
taxpayers.25  To ensure that abnormally low tenders do not prevent other 
bids from being evaluated in genuine competition with each other and that 
the most economically advantageous tender wins, the contracting authorities 
have the opportunity to reject abnormally low tenders.26  
 
Provisions relating to abnormally low tenders are found, for contracts above 
the thresholds, in ch. 12 § 3 LOU. The provision is based on Article 69 of 
the classical directive, and has according to the EU Court of Justice two 
purposes. Firstly, it aims to ensure that the most economically advantageous 
tender can be identified and shall protect tenderers against arbitrariness on 
the part of the contracting authority. The provision contains a list of 
information that a tenderer's declaration may apply. For procurements 
outside the Directive controlled area contains a similar provision in ch. 15 § 
17 LOU.27 
 
As already mentioned, there are suppliers that submit tenders that appear to 
be abnormally low at first glance, maybe because it’s set to zero SEK. A 
                                                
23 Rosén Andersson m.fl., Lagen om offentlig upphandling – En kommentar, p. 42.   
24 Dir. 2014/24/EU.  
25 Alexandersson och Hultén, Orimligt låga bud vid upphandlingar, p. 7. 
26 Lundvall and Pedersen, Osund strategisk anbudsgivning i offentlig upphandling, p. 29. 
27 Lundvall and Pedersen, Osund strategisk anbudsgivning i offentlig upphandling, p. 32. 
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zero bid is to be considered abnormally low, but there is no automatic 
rejection due to zero bids. It will then fall under ch. 12. 3 or 4 § LOU and 
must be investigated by the contracting authority.28 
 
The European Court of Justice has not had to consider such an extreme case 
of zero bids. But, the court has ruled that the adversarial procedure should 
be seen as a standpoint for when tenders are considered abnormally low. 
The Court has observed that the provision that gives the contracting 
authority a right to require explanations for tenders that are abnormally low 
is not an exhaustive list. The Court further has stated in that paragraph that 
the explanations are only examples of explanations that the tenderer may 
submit to show that the proposed price is seriously meant.29 
 
Tenderers, who intend to submit a tender that may be suspected as 
abnormally low, have rules other than LOU and the public procurement 
directive to take into account. Should a bidder put an abnormally low tender 
and at the same time hold a dominant position, said behavior may be 
considered an abuse of a dominant position.30 The SCA thus considers that 
the burden of proving the seriousness of an abnormally low tender should be 
on the tenderer. This position is thus justified by the purpose behind the 
regulation concerning abnormally low tenders that would otherwise be 
difficult to achieve. The SCA claims in correspondingly that the purpose 
behind the regulation concerning abnormally low tenders, which is to save 
the contracting authority from having to enter unserious agreements, 
indicates that the burden of proof should lie with the tenderer. Arrowsmith 
believes, like the SCA, that the idea behind the regulation concerning 
abnormally low tenders aims to protect the contracting authorities from 
being forced to accept tenders from suppliers who will not fulfill their 
commitments.31 
                                                
28 C-76/81, Transporoute; Nord, Lag (2007:1091) om offentlig upphandling 12 kap. 3 §, Lexino 2012-
07-01. 
29 Joined Cases C-285/99 and C-286/99 Lombardini and Mantovani, p. 83. 
30 Falk, p. 404.  
31 Arrowsmith p. 536-538.  
 22 
 
Falk and SCA are unanimous in the view that the contracting authority has 
no option to reject a tender on the ground that it is abnormally low when a 
bidder has provided an adequate explanation.32 Arrowsmith argues that the 
contracting authority cannot reject an abnormally low tender until it carries 
a risk of non-delivery.33 This makes it more difficult for contracting 
authorities to reject such tenders and, in the end, to prevent UNSB. 
 
2.3.5 Undeclared work 
UNSB could include violations of laws and agreements of suppliers that 
provide competitive advantages in public procurements. It is concerning that 
public procurement is associated with the problem of undeclared work in 
forums and contexts in which fair competition and conditions are discussed. 
The distortion of competition is currently described as one of the most 
harmful consequences of undeclared work. No statistics or studies have 
been produced on the extent of undeclared work relating to the execution of 
public contracts. The available statistics do not show the extent to which the 
customer is public or private. SCA states that undeclared work is most 
common through subcontractors.34 
 
In several articles and reports about undeclared work it is stated that some 
industries have emerged as particularly vulnerable. The sectors that stand 
out in terms of problems with undeclared work are building and 
construction, cleaning services, employment agencies, and transportation 
and moving services.35 The problem can generally be described as firms 
operating in industries with extensive undeclared work that are often forced 
to cheat themselves or to lose the procurement.36  
                                                
32 Falk p. 405; Lundvall and Pedersen, osund strategisk anbudsgivning p. 29-30.  
33 Arrowsmith, p. 534-536. 
34 Swedish Competition Authority report, Osund konkurrens i offentlig upphandling - Om 
lagöverträdelser som konkurrensmedel, p. 20. 
35 Almega, Svart och vitt – Hur upptäcker jag ett oseriöst företag (2008) p. 5; LO, Handbok för 
ordning och reda på arbetsmarknaden (2012) p. 30. 
36 Swedish Competition Authority report, Osund konkurrens i offentlig upphandling - Om 
lagöverträdelser som konkurrensmedel, p. 23. 
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2.3.6 Breach of health and safety regulations 
Although undeclared work appears to be the biggest problem in public 
procurement, there are other offenses, which are just as harmful for the 
competition neutrality in public procurement such as breaches of health and 
safety legislation, other legislations, or simple breach of contract. The 
Swedish Work Environment Authority said in a report in 2012 that with an 
increasing number of contracts and long construction chains in combination 
with the difficult application of the rules on public procurement there is a 
risk of occupational responsibility to be unclear.37 
 
2.3.7 Breach of Contract 
An additional form of UNSB is where bidders structure the bid and price on 
the basis that they do not intend to fulfil all obligations under the terms of 
the relevant agreement. This rarely becomes a violation of the law but 
instead is seen as a civil breach of contract. It is very important that 
contracting authorities writes a clear agreement that includes sanctions for 
breach of contract. Penalties should also be adapted to the nature and extent 
of various breaches of contract: that only reserve the right to cancel the 
contract irrespective of the manner in which the supplier breaches it. Lack 
of follow-up by the authority may increase the risk of unserious tenders. In a 
survey for suppliers, it became evident that only a quarter of the contracting 
authorities that award contracts regularly monitored them.38 It may be 
related to the SCA’s own inquiry, where three-quarters of the purchasers 
completely agreed with the statement, that increased monitoring of public 
contracts could reduce the risk of unsound strategic bidding. Because then 
the tenderers would not calculate, before submitting their tender, with that 
you do not need to meet all contractual obligations.39  
                                                
37 Arbetsmiljöverket, Förstudie kring det fortsatta arbetet med utländska företag och arbetstagare 
(2012) 
38 Upphandlingsutredningen 2010, Goda affärer – en strategi för hållbar offentlig 
upphandling, SOU 2013:12, p. 155f. 
39 Swedish Competition Authority report, Osund konkurrens i offentlig upphandling - Om 
lagöverträdelser som konkurrensmedel, p. 27-28. 
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2.4 Competition aspect of UNSB 
2.4.1 General remarks 
In this section, I intend to go through the UNSB problems that may fall 
under competition law. As seen above, the different types of UNSB that 
exist might also fall under competition law. In this chapter, I will try to 
discuss what types of the UNSB that could fall, and be caught, under 
competition law, in order for us to later discuss the prevention of UNSB.  
 
The Swedish competition act (KL) seeks primarily to protect the economy 
and consumers, but competitors are also protected against a company who 
willfully or negligently violates the regulation, which will, if caught, be 
ordered to pay the damages caused by its action. In other words, it can be 
said that the purpose of KL is to limit the negative consequences of market 
power, which is achieved through three main categories; prohibiting anti-
competitive agreements, prohibition of abuse of dominant position and by 
associations of undertakings that create or strengthen a dominant position.40 
The first two categories above are the most common under public 
procurement.  
 
2.4.2  Anti-competitive agreements – ch. 2 § 1 KL 
Ch. 2 § 1 KL addresses the rules regarding anti-competitive cooperation, 
which is defined as: Agreements between undertakings which have as their 
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition on the 
market in a significant way, are prohibited. Under this paragraph there are 
several forms of agreements that could fall under the concept of UNSB.  
For example, collusive tendering (a.k.a. cartel bidding) occurs when 
tenderers/suppliers, secretly collude to raise prices or lower the quality of 
                                                
40 Nilsson, J-E. Bergman, M. & Pyddoke, R. (2005) Den svåra beställarrollen – Om 
konkurrensutsättning och upphandling i offentlig upphandling, p. 59. 
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goods or services in order to win a public contract. Bid rigging is illegal and 
can be sanctioned through competition law.41  
 
There are many forms of bid rigging. It could be that one competitor stays 
out of the procurement in order for the other one to win. It could be that the 
competitor agrees on submitting a bid, which is higher in order for the other 
competitor to win the contract. Furthermore, it could be that competitors 
divide the market between themselves where they will not intervene in their 
separate procurement procedures.42 
 
Heimler ellucidates the different forms of anti-competitive agreements in 
public procurement procedures and stresses that said forms are hard to 
detect because the leading companies create an artifical environment that 
looks competitive from the outside.43 
“Bid rigging agreements generally fall into the following 
categories:  
Bid suppression. One or more competitors agree to refrain from 
tendering or to withdraw a previously submitted tender so that 
another company can win the tender. The parties to the 
agreement may administratively or judicially challenge the 
tenders of companies that are not party to the agreement or 
otherwise seek to prevent them from tendering, for example, by 
refusing to supply materials or quotes for subcontracts.  
Complementary bidding. The competing companies agree 
among themselves who should win a tender, and then agree that 
the others will submit artificially high bids to create the 
appearance of vigorous competition. Or, the losing companies 
may submit competitive prices, but along with other 
unacceptable terms.  
Bid rotation. The competitors take turns being the winning 
tender, with the others submitting high bids. The companies 
                                                
41 OECD, Guidelines for fighting bid rigging in public procurement, p. 1. 
42 OECD, Guidelines for fighting bid rigging in public procurement, p. 2-3. 
43 Alberto Heimler , Cartels in Public Procurement, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Vol. 
8, No. 4 (2012), p. 853. 
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agreeing will generally try to equalize the tenders won by each 
over time. A strict pattern of rotation is often a clue that 
collusion is present.”44 
 
These different categories of bid rigging are what could fall under the 
concept of UNSB and, furthermore, manipulation of relative evaluation 
models and corporate strategic bidding. 
 
Cartels are more likely to be found in public procurement, because the 
numbers of participants are limited. It could be defined as secret agreements 
that are established between potential market rivals with the sole scope of 
not competing with each other. Bid rigging is the cartel practice mostly used 
in public procurement.45 The SCA has interviewed practitioners which have 
stated that, where there are suspiciously high prices, big differences, too 
much similarity between the tenders, constantly winning firms, questionable 
subcontract practices or suspect joint tenders, then public authorities might 
be facing bid rigging practices.46 
 
The prohibition for anti-competitive agreements relates not only to the 
contracts involving an actual distortion of competition but the law also 
covers the intention. This means that an agreement that has the intent or 
purpose to prevent, restrict or distort competition, but in itself is not a 
restrictive effect on the market, is to be considered prohibititive of 
competition and may result in sanctions.47 In recent years, infringements of 
the competition rules and the penalties for these offenses have become 
tougher. One of Sweden's highest fines ever imposed amounted to 1 700 
million SEK in the so-called “asphalt” cartel, where the SCA found that the 
companies cooperated regarding paving work in major parts of Sweden. 
                                                
44 Alberto Heimler , Cartels in Public Procurement, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Vol. 
8, No. 4 (2012),. p. 853-854. 
45 Alberto Heimler , Cartels in Public Procurement, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Vol. 
8, No. 4 (2012),. p. 849.  
46 Swedish Competition Authority, Twelve ways to detect bid- rigging cartels, seen on 
Konkurrensverket’s webpage on 2015.04.06. 
47 Nilsson, J-E. Bergman, M. & Pyddoke, R. (2005) Den svåra beställarrollen – Om 
konkurrensutsättning och upphandling i offentlig upphandling, p. 59. 
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Tenderers were found to have coordinated their bids in advance and also to 
agree on a strategy for bidding. Four of the cartel members were major 
players in the market; NCC, Skanska, the Swedish Road Administration 
Production and Peab; moreover, there were a few other small businesses 
with the cartel.48 
 
2.4.3  Abuse of Dominant position - ch. 2 § 7 KL 
The rules regarding abuse of dominant position are found in ch. 2 § 7 KL. 
What constitutes as an abuse is summarized in KL in four points: 
1. Directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other 
unfair trading conditions; 
2. Limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; 
3. Applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions, thereby trading 
parties at a competitive disadvantage; 
4. Pushing to conclude an agreement by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations that, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no 
connection with the subject of the agreement. 
 
For a company to be presumpted to be dominant, it requires a market share 
of approximately 40 to 50 percent. Similar to EU law, it is not forbidden for 
one or more companies to hold a dominant position but if companies are 
abusing and exploiting their market position it is contrary to the law. This 
means that the behaviour of an undertaking in a non-dominant position is 
allowed while the same behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position 
could be prohibited. In procurement procedures, predatory pricing and the 
multiple discount offers are two behaviours that are to be considered as an 
abuse of dominant position. Predatory pricing is where a dominant firm 
chooses to charge a price that is below the business variable costs. There 
may also be a case of predatory pricing when the price is in the range 
                                                
48 Nilsson, J-E. Bergman, M. & Pyddoke, R. (2005) Den svåra beställarrollen – Om 
konkurrensutsättning och upphandling i offentlig upphandling, p. 98-99. 
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between the company's average variable and average total costs. Normally, 
it must be demonstrated that the price is set to consciously try to exclude a 
competitor.49 Predatory pricing is something that could fall under the 
concept of UNSB. It could both be corporate strategic bidding and 
manipulation of relative evaluation model. In other words the company is 
directly or indirectly imposing unfair selling prices or other trading 
conditions.  
 
The difference between low tenders founded in a market under price 
pressure and low bids based on a strategic predatory pricing may be difficult 
to detect for competition authorities in the Member States.50 A predatory 
pricing strategy involves a dominant player that lowers its prices in order to 
close out competitors from the relevant market. Once this objective is 
fulfilled, then the prices will increase in order to compensate for those costs 
that the predatory pricing resulted in.51 
 
In the Market Court, for a finding of predatory pricing, they used a 
comparison between the tender price and the costs, variable as well as total, 
which the tenderer had. The court has also hinted that there is possibilities 
for a dominant player to defend a tender lower than the variable costs. To 
reverse that presumption requires clarification with regard to the purpose of 
the tender, which may not be anti-competitive. The dominant tenderer in the 
SJ-case argued that the abuse did not exist when there was no opportunity to 
retrieve the costs. The argument was that if the dominant tenderer (SJ) raises 
the prices at a future procurement then someone else would have won that 
procurement.52 
 
Another behaviour that dominant firms should be aware of in public 
procurements is cross-subsidies. That companies transfer resources to its 
                                                
49 Nilsson, J-E. Bergman, M. & Pyddoke, R. (2005) Den svåra beställarrollen – Om 
konkurrensutsättning och upphandling i offentlig upphandling, p. 60-61. 
50 Jones & Sufrin p. 392. 
51 Wetter m.fl. p. 594. 
52 MD 2000:2. 
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different group companies is something that occurs daily and is usually not 
something reprehensible behaviour. It may for a dominant player, however, 
imply an abuse to use cross-subsidies to impede competition in a market, 
especially in a public procurement procedure. Cross-subsidies can be used 
to finance predatory pricing as the low price level imbedded in predatory 
pricing makes possible potential domestic support measures within the 
company group. 
2.5 Reflection 
The different forms of UNSB can be viewed through both competition and 
public procurement. As mentioned above, the corporate strategic bidding 
under public procurement could be viewed as an anti-competitive agreement 
under competition law but also, if there is few market players, as an abuse 
of dominant position. LOU potentially can prevent some types of UNSB 
such as abnormally low tender. In LOU, there are remedies in order to 
prevent such behaviour as is evidenced by the case law in the following 
chapter. LOU does not actually prevent all types of UNSB and this is why I 
ventured to examine the possibility of utilizing competition law to be able to 
prevent UNSB. Could competiton law ch. 2 § 1 and 7 be a solution? Is this a 
sufficient deterrent?  Lundvall and Pedersen have acknowledged that there 
is a problem with UNSB but in my opinion they are overly focused on LOU 
and have not actually considered the practical consequences—which is 
distortion of competition. A solution could be to have an obligation to do a 
competition assessement in procurements. In the preamble to the 
procurement directive, it is stated that competition should be considered in a 
public procurement procedure; but, the assessment hasen’t been applied in 
reality.  
 
For example, some of the other unsound strategic forms such as undeclared 
work and breach of safety regulation will not actually be analysed in-depth 
because they are violations of other regulations, which my essay won’t 
examine further. Instead, the focus is on the concept of UNSB, which is not 
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illegal but very well should be on multiple levels. Moreover, it is important 
to know that companies could use undeclared work, in order to give an 
abnormally low tender and therefore also fall under the concept of UNSB. 
In my opinion, which is contrary to Lundvall and Pedersen, UNSB distorts 
competition and prevents the full functioning of the internal market and not 
just higher administrative costs. I am afraid that if UNSB is not prevented, 
the fact that the major suppliers are more likely to identify loopholes within 
the regulatory framework for UNSB and thus utilize these opportunities 
mightresult in suppliers’ strengthening of market position in relation to 
smaller or newly established providers/tenderers. It is therefore possible that 
UNSB in the long run can lead to entry barriers on the market and 
contribute to fewer new companies that can manage to establish themselves 
as suppliers for the public sector. 
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3 Unsound strategic bidding 
cases 
3.1 General remarks 
In this chapter, the purpose is to explain some of the most important cases in 
the area of UNSB that could shed some light on the non-existing interaction 
between competition and public procurement. Some of the UNSB problems 
could not be found in the case law but are still relevant for the essay as such.  
In the preamble to the public procurement directive it is stated that 
competition law considerations should be regarded in the procedure but all 
cases in Sweden have only considered LOU or KL seperately. 
3.2 Manipulation of relative evaluation 
model  
In Administrative Court of Appeal 471-14, Leksand Bostäder AB and 
Leksand Municipality (the municipality) carried out the public procurement 
for ventilation equipment. Belab Ventilation AB won the contract but then 
then municipality canceled the contract in that Belab had manipulated the 
evaluation model in order to win. Belab had offered 0 per hour for the work 
to be performed outside normal working hours, which meant that Belab 
would reject the work to be performed outside normal working hours. Belab 
had also left numerous varying discounts that made it harder to evaluate the 
tender in comparison to the other bidders. The court stated that the 
evaluation model could be manipulated in the way that it could not secure 
that the most economically advantegous tender wins. This is against the 
purpose of LOU and the decision to cancel the contract thus rested on 
objectively acceptable reasons.53 
                                                
53 Administrative Court of Appeal 471-14, p. 4-5. 
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3.3 Abnormal low tender  
The purpose of the provision in ch. 12 § 3 LOU is to protect the contracting 
authorities so that they can reject tenders that are not reputable. The 
assessment of whether the tender prices shall be deemed low should be 
made in relation to the procurement object. The contracting authority has the 
burden of proving that the circumstances are such that the tender price itself 
is so low that there are grounds for doubting its seriousness. The burden of 
proof that the tender is serious is then transferred to the tenderer. The 
provision of the directive, which is the basis for ch. 12  § 3 LOU gives the 
contracting authorities broad discretion to determine whether a tenderer's 
explanations for his tender shall be deemed sufficient for the tender to be 
evaluated or in spite of the explanations, should be rejected.54  
 
One case concerning abnormal low tenders that has been sent to the 
Supreme Administrative Court is the Rexab Flytt and Flyttningsbyrån case. 
It was a procurement procedure between Eskiltstuna municipality and two 
moving services companies. Here the contracting authority wanted an 
explanation of the price list that Rexab Flytt AB (“Rexab”) and 
Flyttningsbyrån had sent in. The explanation were that they looked at the 
procurement contract as a whole, and decided that the contract weighed in 
total would have positive effects for Rexab and Flyttningsbyrån in spite of 
that some posts would be done at loss. They also stated that the contract in 
total would not jeopardise the companies in regards of risking bankruptcy. 
The municipality stated that they were afraid that the suppliers would not 
deliver and also that the companies (Rexab and Flyttningsbyrån) prices were 
only half of the other suppliers. Here the court took into consideration the 
companies’ annual turnover in relation to the contracts’ total worth which 
was only 4 % of the turnover for Rexab. This was an indication that the 
company has other customers that can be relied upon and that this contract 
in spite of being done at loss would not jeopardise bankruptcy. The court 
                                                
54 Swedish Competition Authority report, Osund konkurrens i offentlig upphandling - Om 
lagöverträdelser som konkurrensmedel, p. 59-60. 
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also recognised that a parent company with good financial status could be a 
reason to be considered when looking at the explanation of abnormal low 
tenders from subsidiaries, especially since Flyttningsbyrån was a relatively 
new founded subsidiary but had a parent company with good financial 
status. The conclusion was that the companies’ tenders should not have been 
rejected from the procedure, because they had sent legitimate explanations 
for the low tenders and shown the seriousness of the tender. The highest 
court in Sweden, in these matters, are now yet to decide if the judgment 
have been done right.55 The ECJ has ruled that the burden is on the tenderer 
to prove that the tender is meant seriously and therefore does not put the 
burden on the contracting authority to first prove the tenders’ 
unseriousness.56 
 
The tenderer's right to clarify its tender, is important so that the contracting 
authority shall not be able to make arbitrary decisions. In order for this 
requirement to be met, the contracting authority's request has to be clearly 
expressed in order for the bidder to understand how the authority perceives 
the tender as abnormally low. If a bid, after a left explanation, cannot be 
considered abnormally low then the tender may not be rejected on the basis 
of the provision in the procurement directive, art 69, or ch. 12 § 3 LOU.57 
 
In Administrative Court of Appeal 6230-13, the court states that there is no 
definition in LOU or the EU directive on what is an abnormally low tender. 
Nether is it defined in the case law. The SCA defines it as a tender which 
the contracting authority could reject after have followed the procedure in 
LOU. Furthermore the court has established that the burden of proof is the 
contracting authoritys’, in regards to show that there are reasons to question 
the seriousness of the tender because of the abnormal low price. If they have 
                                                
55 Administrative Court of Appeal 1165-1166-14, announced on 2014-10-29 in Jönköping, p. 5-6. 
56 C-599/10, para. 29. 
57 C-599/10 para. 31. 
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reasons for questioning the seriousness then it is up to the tenderer to show 
the court that it is serious.58 
3.4 Abuse of Dominant position in public 
procurement – ch. 2 § 7 KL 
An individual has in a letter to SCA questioned whether Samhall AVEBE 
AB competes on equal terms regarding the operation and maintenance of the 
park and streets. In the letter, the complainant stated that the company has 
used predatory pricing in a procurement procedure conducted by the City of 
Stockholm in spring 1994. The Competition Authority stated that Samhall 
does not appear to be dominant, why the prohibition of abuse of dominant 
position, ch. 2 § 7 in KL was not applicable in this case. The competition 
authority acknowledged that the calculation of a company's market share 
assumes that the relevant market is defined. The relevant market is defined 
through determining both product market and the geographic market.  
The relevant product market is where the buyers consider the products 
interchangeable. The relevant geographic market was determined to Sweden 
or part thereof. For the determination of the relevant geographic market, 
transportation facilities and transportation possibilities have significance. 
According to the SCA, the relevant product market in this case was the 
operation and maintenance of the park and streets, so-called road 
construction, and the geographic market was the Stockholm area. Road 
works is a new business area for Samhall. There are several major 
construction and real estate companies that compete with Samhall in the 
relevant market. Samhall can’t therefore be able to act independently of its 
competitors and in conclusion not fall under ch. 2 § 7 KL.59  
 
Another case regarding predatory pricing, which is when a dominant 
company sends in a tender that is below the company’s variable costs. This 
                                                
58 Administrative Court of Appeal 6230-13; Swedish Competition Authority report, Osund 
konkurrens i offentlig upphandling - Om lagöverträdelser som konkurrensmedel, p 60. 
59 SCA dnr 1250/94, ifrågasatt underprissättning - drift och underhåll av park och gator, 1995-04-20. 
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happened in the case between SJ and BK Tåg. Regarding regional train 
traffic in Småland and Halland. The competition authority could show that 
the intention with the predatory pricing was that they wanted to eliminate a 
competitor. SJ had to pay a competition damage fine for 8 Million SEK.60 
This remedy and its meaning will be discussed more in the next chapter. 
3.5 Anti-competitive agreement in public 
procurement - ch. 2 § 1 KL 
The Asphalt case of 2009, concerns bid rigging and is the most known bid 
rigging case in Sweden. The involved undertakings were obliged to pay the 
highest cartel fine in Sweden, of approximately 1 700 million SEK. The 
Swedish Market Court found the undertakings had secrectly made an anti-
competitive agreement where they divided the market and agreed on the 
prices for asphalt servies in public procurement procedures.61 The court 
stated the following: 
 
“The present case concerns cooperation related to public 
procurement. The essence of a public procurement proceeding is 
that the contracting authority, in reply to its contract 
specifications, expects offers from a number of tenderers, which 
are independent from each other. The intention is thus that the 
tenderers submit offers that are not the result of any cooperation 
with competitors in order to enable the contracting authority to 
choose a so cost-effective tender as possible. To the extent that 
tenders have been preceded by contacts between competitors, 
the competitive situation will be affected compared to the 
situation which otherwise would have been at hand. A public 
procurement proceeding is supposed to lead to competition 
between the tenderers. That potential tenderers prepare and 
                                                
60 SCA, dnr 125/96, SJ-BK Tåg; Nilsson, p. 61. 
61 Moldén, Public procurement and competition law from a Swedish perspective – Some proposals for 
better interaction, p. 564; Judgment of the Swedish Market Court in Case MD 2009:11 of 28 May 
2009, para. 87. 
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submit tenders independently of each other is thus an important 
part of the system. Tenders which are submitted as a result of 
cooperation reduces uncertainty of the outcome and will 
probably affect the competitive situation ... Agreements made by 
market participants in view of a public procurement proceeding 
as to who shall win the contract and as to the level of the tenders 
to be submitted, must be regarded as having the object to 
prevent, limit or distort competition. The same applies to 
agreements concerning market partition or limitation of 
production.”62  
 
Däckia and Euromaster AB did not, as opposed to the asphalt case, involve 
secret bid rigging. They had openly supplied joint tenders in two public 
procurement proceedings in 2005. The SCA filed a complaint against the 
two tyre companies for bid rigging in 2010.63 Interesting in this case was, 
the attitude taken by SCA:   
 
“Däckia and Euromaster have stated that they lacked capacity to 
submit own tenders in public procurement proceedings as they 
did not have service stations in all those places where 
participating contracting authorities had activities. Horizontal 
cooperation between undertakings that cannot carry out the 
project or activity related to the agreement on their own is 
outside of the scope of Chapter 2, Article 1 of the Swedish 
Competition Act. A condition for such an agreement to be 
outside the scope of Chapter 2, Article 1 of the Swedish 
Competition Act is that the undertakings do not have the 
possibility to submit tenders on parts of the procurement and 
that the cooperation does not extend to more undertakings than 
is necessary for the provision of services to be possible.”64  
                                                
62 Judgment of the Swedish Market Court in Case MD 2009:11 of 28 May 2009, p. 87–88. 
63 Plaint filed by the Swedish Competition Authority in Case 605/2010 on 24 November 2010. 
64 Plaint to the Stockholm District Court submitted by the Swedish Competition Authority in Case 
605/2010 on 24 November 2010.  
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The SCA concluded that in spite of that both companies had capacity to 
execute the contract independently and were open about the joint tenders, it 
still constituted a bid rigging cartel. In January 2014, the Stockholm City 
Court fined the two tyre retailers, Däckia and Euromaster, 1.2 million 
kronor each for bid rigging public contracts in 2005 through the Swedish 
tire association.65 
3.6 Reflection 
As showed above, the Swedish case law separates competition from public 
procurement. They do not necessarily interact in the way it should be in 
regards to the preamble of public procurement “classical” directive. As 
stated before it is mostly bigger companies that have the resources to use the 
UNSB. As could be seen in the Asphalt case, corporate strategic bidding 
could be prevented by the anti-competitive agreement provision ch. 2 § 1 
KL. It might also prevent manipulation of relative evaluation models. LOU 
could prevent UNSB problem concerning abnormal low tender, because the 
court has opened up the option for contracting authorities to reject tenders 
that utilize manipulation of relative evaluation models and abnormal low 
tender with no business aspects. In conclusion, LOU ch. 12 § 3 might 
prevent some types of UNSB but in order to prevent, for example corporate 
strategic bidding, competition law is needed. The last type of UNSB, which 
can’t be solved by the coordination of competition and public procurement 
is, how to prevent that the supplier rejects to supply? 
 
 
 
 
                                                
65 Judgment by the Stockholm City Court on 2014-01-21,, T 18896-10. 
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4 Remedies 
4.1 General remarks 
This chapter will examine the different remedies under LOU and KL. The 
question that arises is which remedy is most efficient in order to prevent 
UNSB. Furthermore I will try to shed light on if the remedies are enough or 
if a legislative change is needed perhaps.  
4.2 Swedish Public Procurement Act  
4.2.1 Appeal and Damages  
Ch. 16 § 1 LOU states that a supplier who claims to have suffered or could 
suffer damage may apply for appeals before the administrative court. If the 
contracting authority has violated the basic principles or any other provision 
of the act and this breach led to the supplier has suffered or may suffer 
damage, then the court shall decide that the procurement shall be made 
again, or it may be terminated, but only after correction has been made. The 
Court's power to decide that an award will be re-made or corrected is limited 
to situations where the contract is not concluded.  If an agreement is 
concluded, then a supplier may instead appeal the concluded contracts 
validity, a so-called annulment.66 Through the rules concerning appeals, 
could suppliers who believe they have suffered damage because of a breach 
of procurement law, have their objections assessed in the Court. This means 
that a contracting authority, and especially the people who have been 
involved in the procurement, must expect to be reviewed by an outside 
party.67 
 
                                                
66 Lundvall and Pedersen, Osund strategisk anbudsgivning i offentlig upphandling, p. 22. 
67 Swedish Competition Authority report, Osund konkurrens i offentlig upphandling - Om 
lagöverträdelser som konkurrensmedel, p. 97. 
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Ch. 16 § 20 LOU states that a contracting authority, which has not complied 
with the provisions, could be liable for the damages occurred for the 
supplier. The contracting authority's liability under this provision may cover 
both lost profits (the so-called positive contract interest) and unnecessary 
costs (the so-called negative contractual interest). Additionally, in some 
cases, a supplier who suffers from an annulment may receive compensation 
for the damage. Such a claim for damage is made to the court. The 
provisions in LOU are addressed to contracting authorities, meaning it is the 
contracting authorities obligation to apply LOU. Furthermore LOU does not 
contain a remedy that can be used to target sanctions against another 
supplier.68 
 
4.2.2 Exclusion of supplier  
Under ch. 10, 1 and 2 §§ LOU it appears that a contracting authority under 
certain conditions is obliged to exclude a supplier from participating in a 
public contract. There is no provision in LOU that expressly regulates the 
contracting authorities' ability to exclude tenderers that have indulged in 
UNSB. The only exclusion that might be applicable is ch. 10, 2 § 1 pc. 4 p. 
LOU, which provides that a contracting authority may exclude a tenderer 
who has been guilty of grave professional misconduct, provided that the 
contracting authority can demonstrate this.69 In the law comments to LOU, 
anti-competitive agreements between bidders could pose as grave 
professional misconduct.70 Meaning that manipulation of relative evaluation 
models might fall under this provision and also agreements in order for 
suppliers to make abnormal low tender without business aspects. 
 
UNSB is not something that is prohibited, and hardly something that in it-
self can be regarded to be grave professional misconduct. However, 
repeated breaches of contract can be regarded as grave professional 
misconduct. A tenderer who repeatedly leaves unsound strategic bids with a 
                                                
68 Lundvall and Pedersen, Osund strategisk anbudsgivning i offentlig upphandling, p. 22-23. 
69 Lundvall and Pedersen, Osund strategisk anbudsgivning i offentlig upphandling, p. 26. 
70 Prop. 2006/07:128 p. 390. 
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condition, which the bidder do not uphold during the term of the agreement, 
could possibly be excluded on the grounds of grave professional 
misconduct. The burden of proof for grave professional misconduct rests 
with the contracting authority. In addition, it should be noted that there are 
some forms of UNSB that does not mean that the tenderer is in breach of 
contract or breaching competition aspects and that in such cases it may be 
difficult to detect grave professional misconduct.71 Exclusion of supplier 
could be used in order to stop suppliers, which do not uphold the condition 
in an agreement to supply the product/service, but then there is a need for 
contractual obligation that states that. 
 
4.2.3 Rejection of abnormal low tender 
To ensure that abnormally low tenders does not prevent other bids to be 
assessed in real competition with each other and that the most economically 
advantageous tender or the actual lowest price can be identified, has the 
contracting authorities in some cases the opportunity to reject abnormally 
low tenders. Provisions relating to abnormally low tenders are found, for 
contracts above the thresholds, ch. 12 § 3 LOU. The provision is based on 
Article 69 of the classic Directive and, has according to the EU Court of 
Justice two purposes. Firstly, it aims to ensure that the most economically 
advantageous tender can be identified, and shall protect tenderers against 
arbitrariness on the part of the contracting authority. The provision contains 
a list of information that a tender should contain. For procurements outside 
the directive controlled area there is a similar provision in ch. 15 § 17 
LOU.72 It is allowed for bidders to squeeze their profit margins or even 
make losses, as part of a deliberate strategy to gain market shares.73 This 
does not pose grounds to reject the tender. However, such procedures could 
                                                
71 Administrative Court of Appeal in Jönköping announced on 9 june 2009 in case nr 4211-08 and 
Administrative Court of Appeal in Göteborg announced on 15 april 2011 in case nr 2090-11; 
Lundvall and Pedersen, Osund strategisk anbudsgivning i offentlig upphandling, p. 26. 
72 C-76/81 Transporoute mot Ministère des travaux publics p. 17, mål C-147/06 and case C-148/06 p. 
6; Lundvall and Pedersen, Osund strategisk anbudsgivning i offentlig upphandling, p. 27. 
73 Joined cases 147/06 och 148/06 SECAP och Santorso, para. 26.  
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conflict with other rules, such as competition law, so called abuse of a 
dominant position.74  
 
The Competition Authority considers that a tender whose pricing can be 
explained by violations of various regulations can be rejected with ch. 12 § 
3 LOU. The provision does not foresee a situation where the bidder will not 
be able to perform the contract.75 A supplier who does not fulfill its 
obligations with respect to taxation, environmental protection, worker 
protection and working conditions may indeed offer lower prices without 
affecting the ability to perform the contract in question. The SCA believes 
that contracting authorities should not have to enter into agreements with 
bidders who intend to violate these rules to carry out the assignment in 
accordance with agreed terms. It is often difficult for the authority to 
investigate whether this is the case.76 
 
The SCA considers that the tenderer should have the burden of proving that 
a low offer is legitimate, in respect to the confidentiality of trade secrets 
relating to the company's cost structure, pricing strategies or similar. 
Meaning it would be more efficient if the tenderer has the burden, because 
the contracting authority might not get certain documents in order to do a 
justified assessment. It should be noted that the Swedish courts have held 
that the burden is contrary to the above and therefore lays on the contracting 
authorities.77 
 
4.2.4 Termination of a procurement  
Another question is if the contracting authority which realizes that the 
tenders received in a procurement procedure are due to UNSB, can cancel 
the contract? This since an interruption would give the contracting authority 
                                                
74 Swedish Competition Authority report, Osund konkurrens i offentlig upphandling - Om 
lagöverträdelser som konkurrensmedel, p. 72. 
75 Arrowsmith (2005) p. 535–536. 
76 Swedish Competition Authority report, Osund konkurrens i offentlig upphandling - Om 
lagöverträdelser som konkurrensmedel, p. 78-79. 
77 Swedish Competition Authority report, Osund konkurrens i offentlig upphandling - Om 
lagöverträdelser som konkurrensmedel, p. 82-83. 
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the opportunity to carry out a new procurement with a new request for 
tenders adapted to prevent the kind of UNSB identified by the contracting 
authority. When UNSB has been made possible by a deficiency in the tender 
documents and a contracting authority intends to correct that deficiency in a 
renewed procurement then they need to have objective reasons to cancel the 
contract. The European Court of Justice in Case C-244/02 Kauppatalo 
Hansel, has stated that the contracting authority has objective grounds for 
termination when the reason for termination is that the contracting authority 
realizes that given to the content of the tender documents they do not have 
the option of choosing the economically most advantageous tender. In some 
cases, therefore, the existence of UNSB is likely to constitute an objective 
reason for the termination of procurement.78 
 
4.2.5 Reflection 
First it most be noted that no economic sanctions for tenderers seems to 
exist in LOU. It should be specifically noted that there is no explicit 
prohibition for UNSB. A tenderer who engage in UNSB does therefore not 
normally commit any breach of any law or other regulations.  
 
LOU could prevent certain UNSB, if reading the preparatory works to the 
provisions concerning the remedies. As for example the abnormal low 
tender is only a problem when there are no commercial reasons, such as the 
intention to eliminate competition. LOU will prevent that behaviour because 
if there is a breach of other laws a rejection of abnormal low tender is 
accepted in the case law. The contracting authority could also cancel the 
procurement and make the procurement all over again with the exclusion of 
the misbehaving supplier. The rejection and termination of procurement 
does also prevent UNSB in regards to manipulation of relative evaluation 
models. The major issue here is that contracting authorities does not really 
have the knowledge to conclude when there is a breach of competition law 
why the supervisory authority of SCA should be more included in 
                                                
78 Lundvall and Pedersen, Osund strategisk anbudsgivning i offentlig upphandling, p. 34. 
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procurements to make such decisions. This because only 14 % of the people 
from contracting authorities seem to have good knowledge concerning 
factors and indicators for what is anti-competitive agreements/behaviours.79  
 
There are still certain UNSB problems that could not be prevented under 
LOU, such as suppliers that do not deliver and corporate strategic bidding. 
Could KL prevent these behaviours? 
4.3 Swedish Competition Act 
The Swedish Competition Act (KL) is based on the competition law 
principle of prohibition. This principle means that certain restrictions on 
competition in itself is harmful and therefore should be prohibited. The acts 
substantive provisions are designed with EU law as a model. The intention 
is that KL in any material respect should resemble the EU competition rules 
as much as possible. The Swedish competition rules are currently contained 
in the Swedish Competition Act (2008:579), which entered into force on 1 
November 2008. The Act targets three types of action that may distort 
efficient competition: anti-competitive cooperation, unilateral conduct 
constituting abuse of a dominant position, and structural changes (mergers 
and other types of concentrations). If a practice also affects trade between 
EU member states, the Swedish Competition Authority will apply articles 
101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU).80 The OECD recommends that contracting authorities require 
bidders to sign a "Certificate of Independent Bidding" (certificate of 
independent tendering). Such certificate requires a tenderer to sign a written 
confirmation that the tender has been submitted independently of 
competitors, and that no consultation, communication, contract, agreement 
or arrangement with any competitor has occurred. The certificate is aimed at 
deterring bid rigging. One advantage is that it is easier to prove that a 
tenderer has had contact with a competitor than to prove the existence of a 
                                                
79 Swedish Competition Authority report, Osund konkurrens i offentlig upphandling - Om 
lagöverträdelser som konkurrensmedel, p. 140. 
80 Prop. 2009/10:196 p. 20, 3 kap. 5 § KL. 
 44 
cartel. If it turns out that the bidder has certified unjust conditions, it may 
have been guilty of misrepresentation or any other violation, which could 
lead to criminal sanctions.81  
 
The SCA believes that contracting authorities should take in a contractual 
possibility to withdraw from the contract in the event that the supplier is 
guilty of infringement of competition law. Such a term should make the 
supplier pay attention to the fact that KL prohibits unauthorized restrictive 
practices and should also have a deterrent effect.82 
 
4.3.1 Obligations and Commitments 
The SCA can oblige the companies to stop their anti-competitive practices 
that could constitute an illegal agreement, discriminated prices or any other 
procedure that is not allowed, a so called cease-and-deasist order. Under 
Swedish law, cease-and-desist orders must be more precisely worded than 
corresponding decisions taken by the European Commission: it is not 
sufficient merely to state that the infringement should cease; the SCA must 
clarify how such a interim measure should be carried out (the SCA can only 
impose behavioural remedies that are proportionate and necessary to bring 
the infringement to an end – structural remedies may not be imposed). The 
SCA may accept commitments, except for where there are serious 
infringements. In such commitment decisions, the SCA does not hold that 
an infringement has been committed but only that there is no ground for 
action. There may also be a price injunction that means they have to sell 
their goods or services at an acceptable price. A sales injunction means that 
they sell their goods without any discrimination among buyers. Competitors 
may bring an action against a company and examine whether it can be 
imposed interim measures.83  
                                                
81 OECD, Guidelines for fighting bid rigging in public procurement – Helping governments to obtain 
best value for money (2009), p. 8; Swedish Competition Authority report, Osund konkurrens i 
offentlig upphandling - Om lagöverträdelser som konkurrensmedel, p. 147. 
82 Swedish Competition Authority report, Osund konkurrens i offentlig upphandling - Om 
lagöverträdelser som konkurrensmedel, p. 147. 
83 Carlsson commentary to Swedish competition act (2008:579) 3 kap. 1-4 §§, Lexino 2014-03-31. 
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4.3.2 Competition Fine 
In order to ensure that the competition rules have full effect, there are 
sanctions in order to scare the companies. UNSB practices in the market can 
result in big profits for companies. A major violation may lead to huge costs 
for the company or companies who have been convicted. If you break the 
rules on competition, it is quite common to be imposed to pay a so-called 
competition fine to the state. For example, in competition cases, the SCA 
may not impose fines itself; it must file a summons application and then it is 
the City Court of Stockholm (subject to appeal to the Market Court) that 
imposes the fine.84 However, there is a ten percent ceiling, which says that 
the fine shall not exceed ten percent of the previous year's turnover. The fine 
is set individually for those companies involved in breaking competition 
rules. The minimum fee to be imposed is SEK 5,000 and the maximum is as 
said 10 percent of last year's sales. It means, in other words, the fine varies 
according to the company's success.85 
 
The SCA may, however, decide on a fine order in cases where parties agree 
on substance. So far, the SCA has rendered fine orders in three cases, all of 
which concerned bid rigging in public tenders.86 
 
4.3.3 Damages 
In connection with the competition court cases, there is also a chance to 
claim damages. The possibility to claim damages is a right for legal entities 
as well as for individuals and therefore important for competitors and 
customers who may have been harmed by the company's anti-competitive 
behaviour to claim that right. In principle this means that everyone who has 
somehow been damaged by the company’s conduct can claim damages as 
compensation. However, one must prove that the breach actually led to the 
                                                
84 Prop. 2009/10:196 p. 21-22; Carlsson commentary, konkurrenslag (2008:579) 3 ch. 5 §, Lexino 
2014-03-31 
85 Carlsson commentary to Swedish competition act (2008:579) 3 ch. 6 §, Lexino 2014-03-31 
86 Carlsson commentary to Swedish competition act (2008:579) 3 ch. 16-19 §§, Lexino 2014-03-31. 
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injury, so-called causal link. Action for damages shall be instituted at 
Stockholm District Court. The right for damages is seen as having a 
preventive function. Not only is it an economic point of view for the 
company, but it is also a triggering factor for getting other companies or 
whistleblowers to specify the companies that violate competition rules.87 
 
When calculating the amount of damages the starting point is how much 
damage the restriction of competition has led to. For example, if a 
competitor argues that the distortion of competition have resulted in loss of 
profit, then the court may try to estimate how much that is and replace the 
party with that amount.88 
 
4.3.4 Trading prohibition 
The trading prohibition, as opposed to other sanctions under competition 
law, is imposed on a physical person, which is the same in the EU rules. 
However, other EU countries have criminal liability in connection with 
competition infringements. The rules that the EU has developed are so 
called minimum rules. This means that Member States have the right to 
have stricter rules, but not gentler ones. Sweden has, however, chosen to 
keep the criminal liability outside of competition law and has chosen a 
different path in terms of sanctions on individuals. One can be imposed with 
so-called trading prohibition, if it has been a very severe and prolonged 
violation. The provision has so far never been applied to competition law 
infringements. Anyone, physical person, that through gross negligence have 
ensured that the company joined a cartel may be sentenced to trading 
prohibition. This means that those who have been managing, for example, 
the Executive Director, might be sentenced. Trading prohibition may apply 
from 3 up to 10 years. It means that those responsible may not run a 
business, be the majority of a board, remain in the management of the 
company, which was sentenced for cartel activity. If the company however 
                                                
87 Carlsson commentary, to Swedish competition act (2008:579) 3 ch. 25-26 §§, Lexino 2014-03-31; 
Prop. 2009/10:196 p.21. 
88 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/, last seen 2015-04-22. 
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has chosen to cooperate through the entire competition procedure they will 
not get trading prohibition.89 
 
4.3.5 Leniency programme 
A remedy in order to prevent UNSB in procurement process could be the 
leniency programme, which encourages members of a cartel to come 
forward with their unlawful behaviour and be rewarded leninence. Meaning 
the first that comes forward and reports the cartel gets full immunity.90 It 
seems thus that collusion in public procurement markets have not really 
been affected by the leninency programme.91 One reason could be that bid 
rigging seldom falls under EU law instead it is a member state issue. 
Sweden for example has a lenincy programme.92 Cartels on public market 
are more stable than on the private market and therefore they tend to have 
much more members, which makes it more problematic to discover. One 
discovered cartel in the construction industry constituted about 100 
members.93  
 
Because the public market is stable, the members of the cartel has a low 
incentive to expose each other, therefore the leninency programme cannot 
really reach its full potential to prevent a bid rigging scheme. The leninency 
programme isn’t the remedy to prevent bid rigging and instead focus should 
be more on what contracting authorities could do to prevent and detect bid 
rigging. OECD has in order to help contracting authorities to reduce bid 
rigging, introduced a guideline.94 
 
 
 
                                                
89 Carlsson commentary to Swedish competition act (2008:579) 3 ch. 24 §, Lexino 2014-03-31. 
90 Kovacic, William E. and Anderson Robert D, P.P.L.R. 2009, p 83. 
91 Heimler, Alberto, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2012, p 3. 
92 The current programme is set out in sections 3:12-15 of the Swedish Competition Act 
93 Heimler, Alberto, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2012, p 3. 
94 OECD, Designing tenders to reduce Bid Rigging, Citation by John Fingleton, p 2. 
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4.3.6 Reflection  
Corporate strategic bidding could be seen as anti-competitive agreement that 
therefore would fall under the provision ch. 2 § 1 KL. The companies that 
could be caught by the provision will have to pay a competition fine and 
stop the behaviour. This will then affect the public procurement procedure 
in the way that the procurement will be terminated and then done again. The 
problems here as I see it, is firstly that the contracting authorities need better 
knowledge to detect corporate strategic bidding, why SCAs involvement 
should be overlooked. Secondly, the competition fine will be given to the 
state and not the other tenderers that are affected, by not winning the 
procurement and therefore are the tenderers in need to sue the companies 
that utilized the UNSB in order to get some economic compensation. This 
will be a problem, because the wrongdoing company have already payed a 
large competition fine and risks therefore bankruptcy if getting sued by 
other tenderers for the economic loss they had. Meaning the total worth of 
the procurement contract as if they had won it.  
 
Abnormal low tender, corporate strategic bidding and manipulation of 
relative evaluation models are behaviours that also could be prevented or 
caught by the competition provisions. They could be seen as anti-
competitive agreements that distorts competition and/or be a exclusionary 
behaviour by the dominant company that wants to eliminate competitors, 
were the competitors sole survival lies in winning the public contract, 
perhaps.  
 
There is still a problem with tenderers that does not have the intention to 
deliver, problem type 1 of UNSB. To prevent that, there is a need for some 
form of rules to handle suppliers that participated in procurement 
procedures without honest intentions or intent to deliver, thereby causing the 
other party damage. There are no rules that could be used by the damaged 
tenderer in this situation. For similar situations in civil law, there are rules 
on culpa in contrahendo where a commercial unethical behaviour in some 
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cases can lead to liability even if no contractual obligation occurred. 
Another way to solve it could be a statement/provision in the agreement 
about penalty fines, meaning if the intent and consequence is to use UNSB, 
there is a breach and penalty fine will be applicable. 
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5 The Interaction between 
competition and public 
procurement 
As I have tried to show, there is a problem with UNSB in public 
procurement procedures and it’s not illegal per se, but could be prevented if 
competition assessments would be obligated in the procurement procedures. 
Some remarks about the interaction between the two regulations is needed 
before I will try to analyse and summarise the outcome on how to prevent 
UNSB. 
 
First its needed to point out that competition rules are not applicable to 
contracting authorities.95 However, that does not mean that competition is 
not important in a public procurement procedure. Competition law regulates 
the behaviour of the tenderers and the public procurement rules regulate the 
behaviour of the purchaser.96  
 
The competition and public procurement rules regulate two sides of the 
same transaction and therefore it should not be any conflict or overlap 
between them. Therefore it’s important to reach coherence between the two. 
Otherwise we will not reach effective competition between tenderers in the 
procedure.97 Effective compeition and the prevention of collusion amongst 
tenderers are needed in order to ensure effective functioning of public 
procurement and reaching the objective of ”best value for money”.98 
 
                                                
95 Case C‐205/03 P FENIN v Commission [2006] ECR I‐6295, para 26., Case C-113/07 P Selex 
Sistemi SpA v Commission [2009] ECR I-2207, para 102., Referred to in Ølykke, Grith, How does 
the Court of Justice of the European Union Pursue Competition Concerns in a Public Procurement 
Context?, P.P.L.R. 2011, No 6, p 180-181. 
96 Ølykke, Grith, P.P.L.R. 2011, p 179. 
97 Ølykke, Grith, P.P.L.R. 2011, p 181. 
98 Kovacic, William E. and Anderson Robert D, Competition policy and international trade 
liberalisation: essential complements to ensure good performance in public procurement markets, 
P.P.L.R. 2009, p 68.  
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Albert Sánchez Graells has written the following on the role of the 
competition principle embodied in EU Public Procurement law:  
 
“The inquiry has shown – after reviewing current EU legislation 
and its interpretative case law – how the EU public procurement 
directives have an embedded competition principle that 
constitutes a specification and makes direct reference to 
competition as a general principle of EU law – which serves the 
fundamental purpose of establishing the fundamental link 
between EU competition law and EU public procurement law 
(which are to be seen as complementary sets of regulation that 
do not hold a special relationship stricto sensu). The competition 
principles offers the formal legal basis for the introduction and 
full enforcement of competition considerations in the public 
procurement setting, but the substance or content of that 
principles (i.e. its requirements and implications) need to be 
determined according to the general principles and criteria of 
EU competition law. In this regard, it has been submitted, that, 
according to this principle of competition, EU public 
procurement rules have to be interpreted and applied in a pro-
competitive way, so that they do not hinder, limit or distort 
competition – and contracting entities must refrain from 
implementing any procurement practices that prevent, restrict 
or distort competition.”99  
 
In the classical Sector Directive the principle of competition is embodied 
and it imposes an active obligation on contracting authorities to ensure that 
they conduct public procurement proceedings in a pro-competitive way. 
Swedish administrative courts should therefore treat the pro-competition 
provisions as hard law, meaning that infringements of competition law 
should be considered as infringements of the Swedish public procurement 
                                                
99 Albert Sánchez Graells, Public procurement and the EU competition rules (Hart Publishing, 2011), 
p. 396–397. 
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act.100 The Danish Associate Professor in Competition law, Grith 
Skovgaard, stated that:  
 
 “[W]hen the Commission has finally explicitly acknowledged 
the importance of undistorted competition between tenderers for 
the efficiency of public procurement procedures, it is necessary 
to go all the way and institutionalise competition law 
assessments in public procurement procedures. This 
institutionalisation could by through the oversight body or 
through increasing the role of National Competition Authorities 
in public procurement procedures; however, it is submitted that 
the most optimal solution would be to integrate the oversight 
bodies and the National Competition Authorities.”101 
 
The reluctance of the Swedish Competition Authority to apply competition 
to public procurement is explained by Albert Sánchez Graells as follows:  
 
“Public procurement is at the intersection of the two relatively 
unexplored fields of competition law, as it relates to the 
demand-side market behaviour of the public sector. Therefore, it 
should not be surprising to note that the enforcement of com- 
petition law in the public procurement environment has received 
much less attention than it deserves and, consequently, still 
remains largely underdeveloped. To be sure, competition 
restrictions generated by private entities participating in public 
procurement processes – mainly related to collusion and bid 
rigging – have so far attracted most of the attention as regards 
                                                
100 Moldén, p. 613. 
101 Grith Skovgaard, Ølykke,”How Should the Relation between Public Procurementand Competition 
Law Be Addressed in the New Directive?”, p. 83–84. For an in-depth analysis of competition aspects 
of abnormally low tenders, see Grith Skovgaard Ølykke’s book on Abnormally low tenders with an 
emphasis on public tenderers (DJØF Publish- ing, 2010). 
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the intersection of competition law and the public procurement 
phenomenon.”102  
 
In order to declare agreements void a tenderer has to initiate legal 
proceeding before a Swedish administrative court. However, such action has 
a timelimit, according to LOU ch. 16 § 17, and should therefore be initiated 
within 6 months after the agreement has been concluded. Therefore, it might 
be a more efficient way to use the voidness provisions provided by KL and 
TFEU.  Through them, agreements that are found anti-competitive without 
any justification exemption applicable are not only punishable with fines but 
are also void under ch. 2 § 6 KL and 101(3) TFEU. If there is on-going 
competition law infringements, then an action for injunction that is based on 
voidness could never be time-barred as long as the agreement still exists.103  
Tenderers that wants to attack the validity of a public contract under 
competition law, must file a complaint to the Swedish competition authority 
and only if they drop the complaint, can the tenderer use its subsidiary right 
and intiatiate an injunction procedure before the Swedish Market Court.104 If 
a supplier finds the agreement breaching the competition act, then they can 
use that as a reason to stop honouring the agreement.105 
 
Recent case law from ECJ has shown the EU: s willingness to pursue 
competition concerns in public procurement procedures, such as bid rigging. 
Nonetheless, public procurement law has not really been interacting with 
competition law.106 Even if they are linked, read the preamble of the 
procurement directive, they are not assessed together. One reason for that 
could be that they are enforced through separate systems.107 Public 
procurement enforcement is under the remedies directive108 and competition 
                                                
102Albert Sánchez Graells, Public procurement and the EU competition rules (Hart Publishing, 2011), 
p. 7–8. 
103 Moldén, p. 612. 
104 Moldén, p. 613; Chapter 3, Article 2 of the Swedish Competition Act. 
105 Moldén, p. 613. 
106 Ølykke, Grith, P.P.L.R. 2011, p 180. 
107 Ølykke, Grith, P.P.L.R. 2011, p 183. 
108 Directive 2007/66 amending Council Directives 89/665 and 92/13 with regard to improving the 
effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts. 
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law under regulation 1/2003.109 This applies also in the Swedish system that 
there are two separate systems of enforcement. Two different systems of 
enforcement makes the interaction much more difficult and what also 
complicates it, is the fact that public procurement are procedural rules whilst 
competition law regulates the tenderers behaviour on the market.110 
 
Collusive agreements are a problem in public procurement procedures.111 If 
a contracting auhtority suspects collusion between tenderers, then they 
should contact the SCA, which is responsible for the enforcement of 
competition law.112 It is important to have that comunnication channel 
between contracting auhtorities and the competition authority to discuss bid 
rigging.113 In Sweden, many authorities do not often report suspicious 
behaviour from tenderers because they believe that they need to have full 
proof on the behaviour before reporting it.114 An important notion is that 
there is no provision in the public procurement directive that states any 
obligation to report suspicious competition violation to SCA. 
5.1 Reflection 
To sum up the chapter, the public procurement regime and competition law 
are instrumental to ensure that the internal market with efficient competition 
is upheld. Both systems are dependent on each other. Both systems share an 
objective of European integration but also removing barriers to free 
movement and the creation of effective competition. Therefore should 
UNSB be prevented. 
 
                                                
109 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the Implementation of the Rules on 
Competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. 
110 Ølykke, Grith, P.P.L.R. 2011, p 181 and 183. 
111 Report from the Swedish Competition Authority, ”Osund konkurrens i offentlig upphandling - Om 
lagöverträdelser som konkurrensmedel”, 2013:6, p 138. 
112 OECD, Detecting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement, p 11. 
113 Heimler, Alberto, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2012, p 13. 
114 Heimler, Alberto, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2012, p 3. 
 55 
6 Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
Questions that will be discussed: 
1. How can the legislator prevent UNSB?  
2. Could coordination between public procurement and competition 
prevent UNSB?  
 
Initially, it can be stated that no comprehensive approach to the problem of 
UNSB—in the form of, for example, legislative initiatives or actions from 
any of the central authorities in the field—has previously been taken. A few 
reports from SCA have acknowledged the problem with UNSB, but none 
have actually addressed the problem from the competition perspective. 
UNSB is not illegal as such but it could amount to a breach of competition 
law.  
 
The provision on the rejection of abnormally low tenders is thus both 
difficult for a contracting authority to apply and in many cases a blunt or 
imprecise tool to deal with all types of UNSB. The focus of the work against 
UNSB should therefore in my opinion rather be spent on other types of 
action, such as to develop evaluation models and agreements that make it 
difficult and unrewarding for bidders to engage in UNSB. Moreover, to 
include the competition assessment in public procurement procedures might 
disuade bigger companies from their manipulation of evaluation models 
because it could be seen as an exclusionary behaviour and therefore be 
caught by competition law.  
 
To accomplish this dissuasion, better communication between contracting 
authorities and SCA is required as well as increased abilities for contracting 
authorities to discover anti-competitive behaviours. Another means might be 
to have restrictions for bigger companies in the procurement procedure—for 
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example, that said companies cannot submit tenders which are abnormally 
low if they are the biggest player on the market. One solution could actually 
be the one that OECD already has acknowledged in there guidance that all 
tenderers should sign a document which has as a consequence that 
companies applying anti-competitive behaviour of any kind will be required 
to pay a penalty fine as well as enablethe contracting authority to exclude 
the tenderer from future tenders. I myself recommend that the SCA should 
always be involved in the procurement procedure in order to reach effective 
competition. Moreover, I believe that a legislative change is needed 
concerning a prohibition in the LOU for UNSB in that it will be more costly 
in the long run if there are less suppliers on the markets and thus inevitably 
higher costs for the taxpayers. If the public market does not have effective 
competition, the result could be that in the future there could be only be few 
players on each specific market that would be able to dictate prices and 
conditions.  
6.2 How can the legislator prevent UNSB?  
UNSB behaviours/problems that will be discussed: 
- Manipulation of evaluation model 
- Corporate strategic bidding 
- Suppliers does not fulfil their obligations 
- Abnormal low tender 
 
Problem type 1: Manipulation of relative evaluation model 
Manipulation of relative evaluation models could be seen as, for example, 
an anti-competitive agreement between two competitors. Lunander and 
others propose the use of so-called absolute evaluation models, i.e. models 
in which each tender is evaluated on the basis of objective values, rather 
than through the comparison with the other tenders (the relative model), as a 
way to deal with this problem. Use of absolute evaluation models can be 
perceived as complex and many contracting authorities prefer to evaluate 
tenders in comparison with each other. I think rather that to stop 
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manipulation of relative evaluation models is to detect these anti-
competitive behaviours where the sole purpose is to manipulate the model 
and punish them by exclusion and a penalty fine due to breach of LOU 
provision.  The penalty fine should be of 10 percent and some parts of it 
should be given to the tenderer that would have won the procurement if the 
breaching company had not manipulated the evaluation model.  
 
In this regard, the Administrative Court in Stockholm judgments, February 
18, 2011 in case No. 5913-5915-10 and 21 March 2011 in case No. 5603-
10, should be mentioned. The court held that if a contracting authority's 
conduct breaches the principle of lowest price and it does not reflect in the 
specific case, than this constitutes in itself a violation of the fundamental 
principles found in ch. 1 § 9 LOU. The court gives in these judgments an 
expression that it is not sufficient that an evaluation model is applied in the 
manner indicated in the tender document. It requires also, according to the 
court, that the evaluation model has to lead to the tender, which is actually 
the most economically advantageous or has the lowest price. 
 
Problem type 2: Corporate strategic bidding 
This conduct means that other bidders who do not coordinate their offers 
with other bidders and expect to meet its commitments, will calculate with 
higher costs, impairing their ability to be awarded a framework agreement. 
The conduct also entails higher costs for the contracting authority. This 
issue is based on the framework agreement that is decided by hierarchy 
ranks between the suppliers’ tenders, meaning that bidders are allowed to 
decline the suborder of goods or services for which they offered an 
unusually low price. In this case, a contractual obligation to deliver could be 
one solution to the problem. 
 
In my opinion, the best solution here should be to forbid the behaviour 
because it is anti-competitive. Therefore, the obligation to do competition 
assessments in procurement procedures will discourage or cease this type of 
behaviour because, otherwise, the tenderers will be caught by ch. 2 § 1 KL. 
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It could basically be seen as anti-competitive agreement that is not written 
but distorts competition. The competition provision should then, if 
breached, have a direct channel to the remedy under LOU to exclude the 
supplier. If the supplier is a major player on the specific market, then it 
could also fall under ch. 2 § 7 KL as an abuse of dominant position because 
the exclusionary behaviour distorts competition in that it makes it harder for 
smaller companies to enter the public market. The exclusionary behaviour 
could perhaps be problematic to evidence which is why there is a need to 
lower the burden of proof with regard to said situation in public 
procurement procedures. It should be easier for contracting authorities to 
uphold effective competition in that when there is a suspsion that a company 
could fall under the competition provisions, the contracting authority should 
be able to exclude the supplier and/or require the tenderer to establish the 
propriety of the tender. 
 
Problem type 3: Suppliers does not fulfil their obligations 
This problem can be handled through contractual obligations in the 
agreement where the contracting authority requires that the supplier provide 
the goods/services at prices in accordance with the offered tender. With 
regard to framework contracts with one supplier in which the supplier 
deviates from the contract and its conditions—for example, by eventually 
claiming that a particular good or service is not available and thus 
suggesting a more expensive alternative supplier—the tenderer should be 
required to provide the replacement goods or service for the same price 
agreed upon for the original product or service.  
 
Such contractual terms/obligations should in my opinion be able to reduce 
the supplier's incentive to engage in UNSB by quoting goods and services at 
low prices in order to be awarded a framework agreement, but without the 
intent to deliver in accordance with what was quoted. To handle this 
problem, it is important that the contracting authority regularly monitors the 
agreement and checks that the payment corresponds to the price offered by 
the supplier, and that it is delivered according to what was agreed. It is also 
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important that the contracting authority provides relevant personnel briefs 
and easy to understand instructions on how an order should be carried out 
for the agreement to be implemented properly. 
 
An obligation to deliver, or similar contractual mechanism, also appears to 
be what the Appeal in Stockholm believed should have been included in the 
contracts.115 Another tool to deal with this type of UNSB are different forms 
of penalty clauses if the supplier does not deliver according to the terms in 
the agreement. These penalty fines should be so high that they will make up 
for the costs that the UNSB problem caused. 
 
Problem type 4: Abnormal low tender 
In LOU, the remedy which most contracting authorites use in order to 
prevent UNSB, is the opportunity to reject abnormally low tenders. This 
possibility, however, has certain fundamental limitations and is not always 
an effective remedy against UNSB. First and foremost, it is far from all the 
low tender prices that form part of UNSB. On the contrary, tender prices 
that at first sight seem remarkably low, can be commercially justified and a 
sign that the contracting authority has been successful in exposing the 
procurement to competition. The crucial factor here is whether the supplier 
not only can but also will deliver according to the winning (but low) tender 
price. This factor is important and hard for contracting authorities to 
investigate. It has also proven to be difficult for contracting authorities to 
uphold their arguments in regards to rejecting abnormal low tenders because 
of UNSB, in the appeal courts.  
 
An investigation should be done about the possibility to amend the 
provisions of ch. 12 § 3 and ch. 15 § 17 LOU, so that the burden of proving 
that an abnormally low tender is legitimate or valid is a burden of the 
supplier. As mentioned above, the purpose of this option is to ensure that 
winning tenders actually are the most economically advantageous and that 
                                                
115 Administrative court of Appeal in Stockholm judgment 18 february 2011 in case nr 5913–5915-10 
and the 21 mars 2011 in case nr 5603-10. 
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the tender represents the lowest price assumed in the contract. In this regard, 
ch. 12 § 3 and ch. 15 § 17 LOU are seen as helpful framework to the more 
important rule in ch. 12 § 1 LOU, which states that a contracting authority 
shall accept the tender which is either the most economically advantageous 
or the tender that contains the lowest price.  
 
The placement of the burden of proof applied by the Swedish courts have 
therefore, in my view and Pedersen's opinion, made it unnecessarily difficult 
for contracting authorities to reject abnormally low tenders. This means that 
there may be cases of UNSB where while the EU Court of Justice would 
have been justified to reject a tender, this would not possible in accordance 
with Swedish law. On this basis and in light of the provision on the rejection 
of abnormally low tenders, it is in my opinion that the shift of burden could 
serve as a tool to discourage UNSB and therefore there may be reasons for 
the Swedish government to investigate ways to modify the provisions of ch. 
12 § 3 and ch. 15 § 17 LOU so that the placement of the burden of proof 
enshrined in EU law of the Court are more clearly demonstrated by the 
provisions. Increased requirements for tenderers in this regard would 
indirectly mean that tenderers would have to set out their reasoning for 
abnormally low tenders which, in turn in some cases, would reduce 
tenderers' propensity to engage in UNSB.  
 
Arrowsmith has pointed out that thecontracting authority’s ability to suspect 
or detect UNSB should turn on whether the low level on the price risks the 
tenderer's ability to deliver. The reasoning is most likely correct, but it is 
likely not the only factor that can constitute a suspicious tender. To be able 
to prevent manipulation of relative evaluation models and abnormal low 
tender that are used in order to make “dummy” bids in corporate strategic 
bidding, there is a need to make it easier for contracting authorities to reject 
tenders. This situation is the result of the existence of a safety net for 
tenderers against the contracting authorities power to reject tenders in the 
form of the appeal remedy. All of the above makes evident that contracting 
contracting authorities should be able to reject tenders more easily, 
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especially if said authorities suspect breaches of other regulatory 
frameworks such as such competition law, coupled with longterm 
distortions of competition in the form of a decreased number of players in a 
given market.  
 
6.3 Could coordination between public 
procurement and competition prevent 
UNSB?  
As authors Sanchez and Moldén stated in ch. 5, the contracting authorities 
need to apply more competition in public procurement procedures in order 
to stop certain UNSB behaviours from companies. It is stated in the 
preamble to the procurement directive that competition law should be 
considered. Competition is an imporant aspect to consider in every public 
procurement case in order to have a preventetive effect on the bigger 
companies and moreover on UNSB. I also think that the SCA should be 
involved in all major public contracts so as to conduct a competition 
assessment. The SCA’s involvement could entail an expert group that is 
always available for contracting authorities if competition assessment is 
needed. In order for that to work, there is a need to educate the contracting 
authorities personnel to know when competition assessment should be done. 
In that way, the prevention of certain UNSB types, such as corporate 
strategic bidding and also manipulation of relative evaluation model, could 
be successful. Furthermore, such preventative measures would secure 
effective competition in public procurement procedures. It is my holding 
that competition law is more developed and has more clearly stated 
conditions in order to catch companies that are trying to distort competition. 
The utilization of competition law assessments would probably have a 
preventive effect on bigger companies’ improper conduct in public 
procurement procedures. Another way to discourage companies from using 
UNSB might be to connect the LOU remedies such as exclusion of supplier 
and rejection of abnormal low tender to the competition provisions ch. 2 § 1 
and 7; if within a public procurement procedure the company falls under 
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these provisions, then the contracting authority could execute the provisions 
under LOU to stop the supplier. A penalty fine of some sort should be 
inserted in LOU as well for when tenderers have used UNSB. Then the fine 
would partly compensate the other tenderer(s) for their losses and the other 
part of the fine could go to the SCA in order to spread the knowledge to 
other contracting authorities and their personnel about public procurement 
and competition aspects. 
 
The two legal areas underlying purpose is partly coincident - both aim to 
preserve competition and to create an efficient market. There is therefore no 
question of any conflict between opposing interests. Competition law arises 
only insofar as competition issues occur in public procurement. Nor is there 
any question of a conflict between the legal areas. A provision to link both 
legal areas to each other and especially the competition provisions to the 
remedies of LOU would be a step to prevent UNSB.  
 
Suppliers do not really have any option to prevent other suppliers from 
using UNSB execpt to file a suit because of damages or appeal the decision 
and try to get the tender rejected. 
 
Lastly, I would recommed to have more remedies for tenderers against other 
tenderers that are using UNSB and to have an obligation for contracting 
authorities to communicate all suspicious bid rigging schemes to the SCA. 
A solution to UNSB might be to insert a rule that prohibits UNSB for 
companies. That might be harsh but it might be for the best because it is 
mostly bigger companies that take the risks involved with using UNSB.  
6.4 Conclusion 
- Having obligatory competition assessments in public procurement 
procedures and a direct link that if the company gets caught under ch. 2 § 1 
or 7 the Swedish competition act, then the remedies concerning exclusion of 
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supplier of rejection of abnormal low tender would be applicable. These 
suggestions would solve problem type 1 and 2. 
- Problem type 3 could be solved by contractual obligation, in the public 
contract, to supply. Otherwise will a penalty fine be imposed, which will be 
set as high as the compeitition fine, maximum 10 per cent of the annual 
turnover. 
- Problem type 4 is a behaviour that could also be used in order to 
manipulate relative evaluation models and corporate strategic bidding why 
in order to stop this, there is a need for a legislative change that makes it 
easier to reject abnormal low tenders. Hence, it should be rejected not only 
if the tender might distort competition in the near future but also if it might 
do it in the future. Even if there is commercial business factors for the low 
bid it can be rejected because the contracting authority when looking at the 
market realizes that there are few players on the market and in the long run 
it will be fewer and therefore more likely to raise prices as such and distort 
competition. 
 
I think that UNSB would in the long run lead to entry barriers on the market 
and contribute to fewer new companies manage to establish themselves as 
suppliers to the public sector. Hence, there is a need for a coordination 
between public procurement and competition law, otherwise couldn’t UNSB 
be prevented. I believe therefore that companies with these capabilities to 
manipulate procurements with UNSB, can make use of this tool to impede 
competition in a market and that is not a desirable outcome.  
 
These changes would result in a more extensive section of the law that may 
result in higher costs on the market. The costs will, however, never be as 
high as a contract which must be re-made or if contracting authorities are 
purchasing in a market without any competition. I therefore want the 
legislator to consider making legislative changes in order to coordinate the 
two legal systems, otherwise the public market will continue to cause 
distortion of competition and in the end there might only be minimal players 
on each specific market. Public procurement is consuming 17 per cent of the 
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Swedish gross domestic product (GDP) and in EU the percentage is just as 
high. This is why there is a need to protect the market from distorted 
competition and its effects on the internal market. Because non-existing 
interaction between these two systems in a Member state makes it more 
difficult to achieve an objective to have effective competition throughout 
the EU and to able to uphold transparency in the public procurement 
procedures. 
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